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Abstract
Detecting network trafﬁc volume anomalies in real time is a key problem as it enables measures to
be taken to prevent network congestion which severely affects the end users. Several techniques based
on principal component analysis (PCA) have been outlined in the past which detect volume anomalies
as outliers in the residual subspace. However, these methods are not scalable to networks with a large
number of links. We address this scalability issue with a new approach inspired from the recently
developed compressed sensing (CS) theory. This theory induces a universal information sampling sheme
right at the network sensory level to reduce the data overhead. Speciﬁcally, we address exploit the
compressibility characteristics of the network data and describe a framework for anomaly detection in
the compressed domain. Our main theoretical contribution is a detailed theoretical analysis of the new
approach which obtains the probabilistic bounds on the principal eigenvalues of the compressed data.
Subsequently, we prove that volume anomaly detection using compressed data can achieve equivalent
performance as it does using the original uncompressed and reduces the computational cost signiﬁcantly.
The experimental results on both the Abiliene and synthetic datasets support our theoretical ﬁndings and
demonstrate the advantages of the new approach over the existing methods.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Anomaly detection in wide-area network is a crucial and challenging task nowadays. A volume anomaly
is a signiﬁcant change in the underlying network trafﬁc, which could result in network congestion and
affects the end users [16]. To address the problem of anomaly detection, a framework is needed to
enable the detection of anomalies in real time in order to allow the prompt modiﬁcation of the border
gateway protocol (BGP) routing table. Given the high volume of trafﬁc and the complexity of the network,
the process of detecting anomalies using the raw data is both computationally expensive and requires
signiﬁcant storage resources. In this paper we present an approach aimed at detecting volume anomalies
in wide area network while addressing three key aspects of the problem: (i) the high dimensionality of
the data, (ii) the limited storage resources and (iii) effect of the noise on the data.
A typical network is monitored by local nodes (e.g. routers) where each node sends a time-varying
data stream to the central location for processing. The central processing unit takes the decision after
processing all globally collected streams. In a N-link network, link data measures the trafﬁc ﬂows in each
edge link. Most Internet service providers (ISPs) use simple network management protocols (SNMP’s)
to collect the average trafﬁc volumes transmitted between two point-of-presence (PoP’s) in a network.
The problem is that the data stream aggregated from N links of the network requires to be processed in
real time. In many real world cases the size of the network is very large both in terms of the number
of nodes and links. For example, AT&T’s has 10,214 routers and 12,500 links [21] which is directly
connected customer access routers. Another example is the skitter tool of CAIDA [2] which collected
data from a IP graph of 629,647 nodes and 1,230,572 links.
However, most current techniques to process the data from network links are not scalable to large
networks as the ones mentioned above, and are only suited for small networks. For example, Lakhina
et al. [16] use principal component analysis (PCA) to detect anomalies in the residual subspace of the
original data. While encouraging results have been shown for small-size problems, this PCA approach
suffers from two disadvantages. First, it is not scalable to network size due to the computation of the
large covariance matrix required to obtain the projection onto the residual subspace. Speciﬁcally, the
eigenvalue decomposition complexity is O(N3) and requires a memory storage of O(N2). Second, it
requires to span the aggregation window of size greater than N and thus ﬁne-grain time resolution (less
than N) anomaly detection is poor.
We propose a novel framework for anomaly detection in the compressed domain to tackle the scalability
issue in large-sized networks. Our work has been motivated by the principles of a recently proposed
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information sampling theory called Compressed Sensing (CS) [3], [7]. This theory can be used to reduce
the dimensionality of network data considerably. Our theoretical contribution is a result on the approximate
preservation of the principal subspace in the compressed domain which implies that techniques developed
in the original domain can be readily used in the compressed domain. Thus, anomaly detection can be
analogous to the uncompressed case, but with the advantage of a lower number of measurements. In
addition, the lower number of measurements also allows for anomaly detection at a ﬁner time resolution.
Importantly, the computational complexity is sub-linear with the number of links N.
In the CS framework, the N-dimensional data is captured directly via a non-adaptive and simple linear
projection such that the number of measurements M is only proportional to the intrinsic information
level in the signal. The intrinsic information level is reﬂected in its sparsity K, implying that the signal
has only few non-zero coefﬁcients in some basis.
There are two supporting observations for considering the CS framework in network data processing.
First, it has been previously shown by [16] that high dimensional network ﬂows can be represented by
few intrinsic dimensions. Hence it is reasonable to assume that the network data is approximately sparse
and only a small number of non-adaptive measurements is needed to retain information about the main
trafﬁc. Second, the restricted isometry property (RIP) (see Appendix) helps in retaining the geometry of
the data structure in low dimensional subspace. We note that while the CS theory is primarily developed
for reconstruction of sparse signals from compressive samples, our aim is to detect volume anomalies
and it would be an advantageous to work directly with the compressed data. The CS theory plays a
key role as information-preserving compression techniques in our framework. We will be using a PCA
technique in combination with RIP to detect anomalies in the compressed domain. The residual subspace
still retains the noise-like characteristics which is sufﬁcient for anomaly detection. Thus, by working in
the CS domain, the rank of the new covariance matrix is M and the computational complexity is reduced
to O(M3) where M  N.
We evaluate our algorithm on real trafﬁc traces collected from the Abilene network 1 over four weeks
and synthetic data simulated following the property of typical networks. Our experiment veriﬁes that
on the real dataset the proposed method using compressed data achieves equivalent performance with
a detection rate of more than 94%. For synthetic data, our experiments shows that the PCA technique
performs even better in compressed domain than uncompressed domain for high dimensional data. For
example, the detection rate and false positive rates are 98.4 % and 2% respectively for a data of 1000
1www.abilene.iu.edu
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links and 2000 snapshots in compressed domain, compared to detection rate 98.2 % and false positive rate
9% in the uncompressed domain. Most importantly, the proposed method requires less memory storage
and can be as 100 times faster than the PCA method using the raw data.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss related prior work. Section 3 describes the
problem in detail and provides background information on CS and network anomaly detection. Section
4 explains our proposed method and its analysis. Section 5 describes the data sets, experimental setup
and results while the conclusions are presented in Section 6.
II. RELATED WORK
Network anomaly detection is critical in managing IP networks. The ﬁrst step is feature extraction to
separate major trafﬁc for better diagnosis of anomalies. Lakhina et al. [16] characterize network anomalies
and use PCA to ﬁnd a projection to the residual subspace for anomaly detection. This work however uses
the original data and is only suitable for small-sized networks. Ling et al. [13] propose a decentralized
version of the PCA approach and design a distributed protocol for reducing the communication overheads
between the nodes and the central unit. Whilst it reduces the communication cost, it still needs to solve
an eigenvalue problem of a perturbation matrix which scales signiﬁcantly with the network-size. Zhang
et. al [25] has also used PCA based subspace method for spatial anomaly detection. He has also provided
a comparative performance study of four different models (e.g. ARIMA , Fourier, Wavelet and PCA)
for temporal anomaly detection. Donoho [24] has introduced estimating trafﬁc matrix from link count
data by exploiting the maximum sparsity of the network. Zhang [25] used l1 norm for minimizing the
sparsity constraint of OD (origin-destination) ﬂow matrix and used subspace based techniques directly
on OD ﬂows for identifying anomaly. The drawback of above algorithms are that they never addressed
the scalability issues of the network. Li et al. [17] propose a sketch subspace method which uses a set of
randomly chosen universal hash functions for dimensionality reduction and the subspace based method
[16] for anomaly detection. However, the drawback of the approach is that it relies on heuristics when
selecting the hash functions. An alternative approach has been described in [15] which uses random
projections (RP). However, this method cannot capture the intrinsic structure of the underlying data as
outlined by [16].
In the second step of making statistical decision, the Q-statistic has been used in PCA techniques [13],
[16], [17] due to its simplicity and robustness in practice, particularly for network data. Other generic
techniques have been used in other applications such as SVM for EEG data analysis [9] and support
vector regression for on-line anomaly detection of time series data [19].
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It is important to note that there are other approximate SVD routines to compute the principal subspace
such as incomplete Cholesky [18] or Lanczos [11]. However, their complexity is still depends on the
network size N and our goal is not about numerical SVD routines but rather proving that it is possible
to work on compressed data for the approximate performance, which is much less dependent of the
network size. These approximate SVD techniques can also be readily applied to the compressed data to
even further reduce computational cost.
III. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION
A. PCA and Network Anomaly Detection
Lakhina et al. [16] observed that volume anomalies are rare events in high-level trafﬁc aggregation
and ‘hidden’ in normal trafﬁc. However, as most of the normal trafﬁc is found in a low-dimensional
subspace, PCA can be used to separate the residual subspace (which reﬂects the local ﬂuctuations) from
the principal trafﬁc (which reﬂects the long-term trend) so that anomalies can be more easily detected.
L snapshots of the trafﬁc from N links x i 2 RN;i = 1;:::;L are collected in an aggregated matrix
X = [x1;:::;xL] from which the sample covariance matrix can be estimated x = (1=L)XXT after X
is centralized. Given that U = [u1;:::;uK] are the principal eigenvectors of x corresponding to the
largest K eigenvalues 1;:::;K, the projection onto the residual subspace is P = (I   UUT). Thus,
for any observed data x, its projection into the residual subspace is z = Px = (I UUT)x. If z follows
a multivariate normal distributed, the squared prediction error (SPE) statistic is given as
tSPE = kzk2
2 = k(I   UUT)xk2
2 (1)
and follows a noncentral chi-square distribution under the null hypothesis that the data is ‘normal’. Hence,
rejection of the null hypothesis can be based on whether tSPE exceeds a certain threshold corresponding
to a desired false alarm rate . In [16], the Q-statistic is used to compute the threshold, which involves
the largest K eigenvalues, i.e. Q = Q(1;:::;K) (see (4)). An anomaly is detected when tSPE > Q.
B. Compressed Sensing
In compressed sensing, the original signal is directly recorded in a compressed format and the number
of stored samples is proportional to the information level in original signal. Let us assume that x 2 RN
admits a linear representation by a set of orthonormal basis functions 	 with coefﬁcients , i.e. x = .
Two cases of interest are i) Sparse signal: the signal x is said to be K-sparse if only K entries of 
are nonzero; and ii) Compressible signal: the magnitudes of the coefﬁcients , when ordered, follow
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Fig. 1. Diagram of the proposed approach
an exponential decay [5]. When x is sparse or compressible, CS theory [5], [7], [12] has proved that it
is possible to ‘sense’ x via a simple, non-adaptive and linear projection y = x. The sensing matrix
 2 RMN has a signiﬁcantly smaller number of rows than columns, i.e. M  N, meaning that the
dimension of y is considerably smaller than x. Importantly, it is possible to perfectly recover x from
y under suitable conditions on the sensing matrix . This implies that all the salient information about
x is captured in y, making CS an universal dimensionality reduction technique. When classiﬁcation is
needed instead of recovery, the use of CS is clearly an advantage as the dimensionality of the problem
is reduced (in practice, M = O(K logN)  N, and K is a reasonable upper bound on the sparsity). As
the network data is shown to be compressible, we are motivated to use CS to address the scalability issue
in the original PCA approach. In the following sections we describe our proposed method that employs
both CS and PCA for the network anomaly detection problem.
Remarks: There is a possibility of considering other ”dimensionality reduction” techniques. Since
most dimensionality reduction techniques are adaptive, computationally expensive and likely lossy. In
contrast to new CS techniques is non adaptive, simple and universal and it allows the reconstruction of
original data if it is required and most importantly it can be done at sensing stage. We also note that
CS should not be confused with random projection (RP). Random projection (RP) is used in CS as the
measuremen matrix because they satisfy the restricted isometry property with high probability , but RP
is not the only choice. Recent progress shows that the CS measurement matrix can be deterministically
constructed [6]. Furthermore, CS theory [7] is concerned with a deep mathematical question on the
inverse problem. RP is only concerned with length preservation of the projection.
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IV. PROPOSED APPROACH AND ANALYSIS
Our proposed approach2 is illustrated in Fig. 1. A sensing matrix  is used to obtain a compressed
version of the trafﬁc from every node y = x. PCA is then performed on y and anomaly detection is
performed in the derived residual subspace.
A. Design of the sensing matrix 
Let signal x be sparse in the basis I. To effectively capture the information about an K-sparse signal
x, CS theory requires each 2K columns of  should behave like an orthogonal system. Equivalently,
this requires the mutual coherence of the overcomplete system  = [1;:::;N] , which is deﬁned as
() = max
i6=j
jhj;kij; (2)
be as small as possible. The problem of designing an overcomplete system  with a small mutual
coherence is known in information theory as frame design [22]. For a real-valued matrix , the lower
bound on the mutual coherence is known as the Welch bound [22]
() 
p
(N   M)=(M(N   1)): (3)
In practice, the Welch bound may not exist for every pair (M;N) and even if it exists, designing 
which meets the Welch bound still remains a difﬁcult task. The challenge is to maintain at the same
time a small number of measurements M and low mutual coherence. CS theory [5] overcomes this
difﬁculty by exploiting the fact that random matrices satisfy the RIP condition (see Appendix) with high
probability. Examples of the random matrices include random Gaussian, random Bernoulli, and random
partial Fourier matrices. However, this is only an asymptotic result, i.e. suitable for problems where N
is large. For problems of smaller size, a particular realization might not achieve small mutual coherence.
Thus, in order to obtain a good sensing matrix, we start with a random Gaussian matrix and then apply
the recently proposed algorithm by Elad [8]. This algorithm exploits the fact that the mutual coherence of
, with each column normalized to unit norm, is the maximum magnitude of the off-diagonal elements
of the Gram matrix G = T where the Gram matrix has the rank M. Hence, by iteratively shrinking
the entries of the Gram matrix, forcing its rank to M, and taking square root, a smaller mutual coherence
2The diagram shown in the paper is only symbolic and we suggest that CS projection could be done either at the central node
or within the network. If done at the central node, there are ”database-friendly” projection matrices of mostly 0’s (with p=2/3)
and few 1’s (with p=1/6), meaning that it can be efﬁciently implemented. If done within the network like the randomized gossip
algorithm [20], [1], the extra bandwidth is needed only locally and hence still feasible.
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Fig. 2. Plot of eigenvalues
for  with a speciﬁed rank M is achieved. Even though the algorithm could be sensitive to the parameter
setting and its convergence is yet to be studied, we found in practice that this method can improve the
mutual coherence quite considerably.
In practice, the actual signal x might not be sparse in the basis I but in some 	. In this case, CS
theory requires (	) to be small instead. If o is the optimal sensing matrix for the basis I then the
optimal matrix  for the basis 	 is found from  = o	 1, assuming that 	 is invertible.
B. Anomaly detection with CS data
The PCA approach is now applied to the compressed data Y = [y1;:::;yL] where y = x. Suppose
that the compressed data is centralized, the projection matrix is found from the eigenvalue decomposition
of the CS covariance matrix y = (1=L)YYT. As our analysis shows subsequently, the number of
principal eigenvectors remains the same in the CS domain and that the SPE statistic in the CS domain
also approximately follows the non-central 2 distribution. Hence, it is sensible to use Q-statistic to set
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Fig. 3. Abilene trafﬁc data
the threshold for anomaly detection. It is based on (1 ) conﬁdence level of standard normal distribution
where  is the desired false alarm rate:
Q = 1
"
c
p
22h2
0
1
+ 1 +
2h0(h0   1)
2
1
# 1
h0
: (4)
where, h0 = 1   213
32
2 , i =
PN
j=K+1 i
j for i = 1;2;3, c = (1   ) percentile in a standard normal
distribution and Q, and j;i = 1;:::;M are the eigenvalues of y.
C. Temporal analysis of PCA in CS domain
In practice, the projection onto the residual and principal subspaces are obtained from the eigenvalue
decomposition of the sample covariance matrix. When the data is sufﬁciently large, it follows from
asymptotic theory that the subspaces computed approach the true one. However, it is more likely in
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practice that the covariance is computed over a window of ﬁnite length L. The ﬁnite sample effect states
that the quality of the covariance matrix depends on how large L compared with the dimension of the
data N. When L is relatively small, the empirical distribution of the eigenvalues, and hence eigenvectors,
can be severely distorted, i.e. large eigenvalues tend to be too large and small eigenvalues tends to be
too small. When L is smaller than the dimension of the data N, the empirical covariance matrix even
becomes rank-deﬁcient. Even though one might still be able to compute a few principal eigenvalues
and eigenvectors, this rank deﬁciency implies larger error on the empirical values. On the other hand,
if the data is embedded to a much lower dimension M via an information-preserving projection (such
as the CS projection), the empirical covariance matrix in the compressed domain may not suffer from
this rank deﬁciency problem as long as the window length L > M. As a consequent, the empirical
distribution of the eigenvalues and eigenvectors may be less distorted, which means that the computation
of the principal subspace will have a smaller error. For the problem of anomaly detection in wide area
network, this means ﬁne grain time resolution can be achieved in CS domain. This will be demonstrated
subsequently in the experimental section.
D. Analysis
In this section, we provide a detailed analysis to enable a better understanding of the original PCA
method and offer a justiﬁcation as to why CS allows anomaly detection in the compressed domain.
First, we consider a model for the network data as follows
x = s + n (5)
where x 2 RN is the snapshot of network trafﬁc over N links. It consists of two parts: s characterizes the
long-term structure of the trafﬁc and n represents the locally temporal variation which occurs in all links.
Previous studies have found that s lies in a small dimensional space while n has a noise-like behavior.
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that s is sparse in some basis 	 and n are iid Gaussian noise with
variance 2. Further, we can assume without loss of generality that
s = 	 = [	s 	n]
2
4 s
0
3
5 = 	ss (6)
where s 2 RK represents the K nonzero entries of the coefﬁcients. The covariance matrix of x is
x = [	s 	n]
2
4 K + 2IK
2IN K
3
5
2
4 	T
s
	T
n
3
5 (7)
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where K = diagfE[2
s;i]g 2 RKK. Each term i = E[2
s;i];i = 1;:::;K represents the power
distribution in the principal subspace. It is clear that 	s is also the eigenvector corresponding to the
K-principal subspace. The principal eigenvalues of x are 1+2;:::;K +2;2;:::;2. In the PCA
method, when there is sufﬁcient data, the sample principal eigenvectors tend to 	 s hence the data is
projected to the residual subspace using the projection matrix P = I   	s	T
s resulting in
z = Px = (I   	s	T
s )(	ss + n) = Pn: (8)
As n  N(0;2I) we have z  N(0;2PPT). As z follows the multivariate normal distribution, we
know that t = kzk2
2 follows a noncentral 2 distribution. For anomaly detection in the residual subspace,
the tail behavior of this distribution is important in setting a suitable threshold for a certain desired false
alarm rate. Previous works use a normal approximation for the tail of this noncentral 2 distribution.
For our analysis, we concentrate on the energy aspect of this residual subspace. The following result is
intermediate.
Lemma 1: E[t] = (N   K)2:
The lemma states that the mean of the statistic used for anomaly detection is equal to the power of the
noise spread in the residual subspace as can be readily seen from (7). Volume anomalies are thus detected
through the changes in the total power of the residual subspace.
Next, we characterize the subspaces in the compressed domain. We show that under CS assumptions,
the principal subspace is approximately preserved while the residual subspace, though not preserved, still
has a noise-like behavior. This suggests that in the CS domain, subtracting the principal subspace for
anomaly detection is equivalent to that in the original domain, which is our argument for doing anomaly
detection in the CS domain.
We make the following assumptions. Firstly, we assume that the noise is small compared with the
principal network trafﬁc, i.e.  i  2, which is consistent with real data. Secondly, we assume3 the
sensing matrix  contains iid Gaussian entries with variance of 1=N. Finally, we assume that M =
O(K logN)[7], which is the standard setting in CS. The basis for our argument is the following result.
Theorem 1: For a network with a sufﬁciently large number of links N, the principal subspace is
approximately preserved in a sense that with probability 1   , (where  > 0) the change in principal
3We note that this is different from the standard CS choice of 1=M. This is just to simplify our arguments in subsequent
analysis only in a sense to prove the eigenvalues remain the same. Effectively,  is scaled down by a factor
p
N=M but
anomaly detection is obviously invariant to scaling so it introduces no technical difﬁculty.
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eigenvalues are bounded by
ji   ij 
p
21(3
r
K
M
+
r
M
N
+ 3
s
2ln 1

M
) (9)
for i = 1;:::;K, where 1 is the largest eigenvalue of x.
Remarks: A similar result on the bound of eigenvalues due to random projection is given in [23, Section
8.2]. However, it contains some parameters which are unclear. Furthermore, their result is not probabilistic
which is the nature of random projections. Lastly, Lemma 8.4 in [23] only provides the upper bound,
whilst our result provides both upper and lower bound using the theory of invariant subspaces.
The above result suggests that the power of the principal subspace is approximately preserved in
the compressed domain. Consequently, the total power of the residual subspace is also approximately
preserved, though the actual residual subspace itself is not preserved under the CS projection. The small
variation in the principal subspace thus subsequently translates to a small change in the performance
of anomaly detection using compressed data as compared to original uncompressed data. The following
result quantiﬁes this small change in terms of one important aspect of anomaly detection, the false alarm
(FA) rate .
Theorem 2: In an identical condition described above, the change in false alarm rate is very small
and is bounded by (with probability atleast (1   ), where ( > 0))
FA  O(
r
M
N
+
s
2ln 1

M
) (10)
Remarks: We note particularly that in general a random matrix used as a projection does not preserve
the principal subspace as the bounds on the deviation of eigenvalues can be too large to be useful.
However, in a case of CS where the dimension of the principal subspace is small (i.e. sparse signals) and
CS parameters are chosen properly, then the principal subspace is preserved. Furthermore, it is interesting
note that in such cases any CS projection can approximately preserve the principal subspace.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The performance of our approach was evaluated using two experiments involving real and synthetic
datasets.
A. Abilene Data
The aim of the ﬁrst experiment was to determine the volume anomaly detection of the method using
a real world dataset. The Abilene dataset4 consists of the readings collected from 41 network links over
4www.abilene.iu.edu
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Metric Time (secs) AUC EER
N PCA CS-PCA PCA CS-PCA PCA CS-PCA
100 0.023 0.004 0.993 0.997 0.06 0.06
500 0.430 0.023 0.996 0.991 0.08 0.08
1000 3.364 0.097 0.982 0.984 0.09 0.02
2000 20.932 0.203 0.986 0.979 0.09 0.02
TABLE I
ANOMALY DETECTION PERFORMANCE ON SYNTHETIC DATA.
a period of several months. The OD trace contains the measurement from each link for every 10-second
interval. We use a subset of the data which covers a period of 2 weeks (1008 measurements per week).
The majority of the data reﬂects normal network conditions with only 6 real anomalies (veriﬁed manually)
in the original dataset. In addition, we injected 45 synthetic anomalies of different magnitude following
the procedure described in [16]. Throughout this section, we will denote PCA computed on uncompressed
data by PCA (Original) only and PCA computed on compressed data by CS-PCA (Compressed).
The trace from the ﬁrst week was used as the training set while the trace from the second week was
used as test data. For the Abilene network data we have N = 41, M = 16, K = 6, and the Welch bound
is 0.1976. Using Elad’s algorithm [8], we achieve a mutual coherence of 0:36 from the initial coherence
of 0:55. The threshold limit Q was computed according to the 1  conﬁdence level and  was varied
between 0 and 1. As  controls the desired false positive rate (FPR), we recorded the FPRs for each of
the  values.
The results from the Abilene dataset experiment are summarized in Figure 4. The ﬁgure shows the
receiver operating characteristics (ROC) plots of the PCA method applied on the uncompressed and
compressed data. As it can be observed from the plot, the performance on the compressed data is very
close to that on the uncompressed data. To further quantify this, we also compared the two ROC curves
using (i) the area under the ROC curve (AUC) and (ii) equal error rate (EER) where the false positive being
equal to false negative. An effective classiﬁer should achieve an AUC close to 1 and ERR small. From the
ROC curves, we determined that the AUC/EER values were 0.95/0.09 and 0.94/0.11 for the compressed
and uncompressed data respectively. These ﬁgures support our claim that the proposed approach performs
equally to PCA on the original domain.
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Fig. 4. ROC curve for the Abilene network data
B. Synthetic Data
The aim of the second set of experiments was twofold: (i) to demonstrate the scalability of our
approached with large N and (ii) to show that it has a better time resolution property when processing
the data stream in CS domain.
The synthetic data sets are generated following the equations (5) and (6). We conduct the experiment for
different number of links N with values 100, 500, 1000 and 2000. The number of readings is L = 2000.
To optimize the CS projection as mentioned previously, we have selected DCT as a basis for 	 and
the sparsity K of the principal signal s is 4. We added zero-mean Gaussian noise (n) with  = 0:01.
To simulate abnormal network conditions we injected 70 anomalies of different magnitude in the signal
following the procedure mentioned in [16].
We selected the number of CS measurements according to M  K logN so that for the number of
links being considered, the values of M were 38, 118, 180, and 290 respectively. The sensing matrices
() were random Gaussian with a mutual coherence of 0.37, 0.37, 0.33 and 0.26 respectively.
Scalability performance: The results from the scalability analysis are shown Figures 5(b), 5(a) and
Table I. Speciﬁcally, Figure 5(a) shows a plot of the eigenvalue distribution and Figure 5(b) shows a plot
of the residual subspace for both PCA and CS-PCA. The results indicate the preservation of the residual
subspace in the CS domain for high dimensional data. This a very encouraging result from the point of
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Fig. 5. Synthetic data
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view of detecting anomaly in CS domain.
Table I compares the performance of PCA and CS-PCA in terms of actual computational time, AUC,
and EER. As can be seen, our proposed method reduces the computational time by a factor ranging from
6 to as much as 200 when N varies from 100 to 2000. Furthermore, the reduction in performance in
terms of AUC and EER is small and for high dimensional data (N = 1000 and 2000), the PCA method
in CS domain performs better than the PCA in original domain. The better performance is a result of
better orthogonality of random vectors in high dimensional space.
We also study the trade-off between compression and performance. Loosely speaking, a smaller value of
the CS dimension M reduces the computational complexity at the cost of potentially lower performance
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due to the increase in the mutual coherence of the sensing matrix. In the CS literature, the value of
O(K logN) has been frequently suggested. We show that this value is also about the same for the
network anomaly detection problem. We consider N = 2000 and vary the value of M between 100 to
1000 and measure the EER and computational time. The results are shown in Figs. 6(a) and 6(b). As
can be seen, selecting M in the range 250   300 gives moderately low error rate at a large reduction in
computational time. If M is too low, the error rate becomes much larger. If M is too large, the reduction
in error rate is not very signiﬁcant whilst the computational time increases somewhat quadratically.
Temporal accuracy: We tested the time resolution property of PCA method on the synthetic data
of dimension (N) equal to 500 and length (L) equal to 2000. The stream was processed by a different
length of moving window (WL = 100;200;300;500) in both uncompressed and compressed domain.
Figure 7(a) shows the plot between EER and WL obtained from PCA and CS-PCA. The plot shows
that, CS-PCA performs better than the PCA method with a smaller window length. For example, when
WL = 100, the EER for CS-PCA (i.e, 0.08) is better than the EER of PCA (i.e. 0.2) and the better
performance of CS-PCA continues as long as the window length (WL) is less than the dimension of
the original data (N = 500). As mentioned in earlier section IV-C, the better performance in CS comes
due to better estimation of the covariance matrix in CS domain. Loosely speaking, if the number of
training sample is less than the dimension of the sample, then the estimation of the covariance matrix is
poor, results in poor performance in original domain. The ﬁnite sample effect is overcome in CS domain,
where dimension of the samples is less than the window length and results in better covariance matrix
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estimation and better performance than original domain. Hence, we can achieve a ﬁne grain temporal
resolution property of PCA technique in compressed domain instead of uncompressed domain. To further
demonstrate this, we have also provided the ROC curves in Figure 7(b) by choosing different value of
WL for PCA and CS-PCA.
VI. CONCLUSION
A new framework of network anomaly detection in the compressed domain has been presented. We
have demonstrated that when the data is compressible, the CS approach allows the analysis and detection
to be equivalently performed over the compressed version of the data. This is extremely important in
making algorithms scalable to high-dimensional problems. We note that our framework presented in
this paper can be extended to a distributed setting similar to [13] to further reduce the communication
overhead between the nodes and the central unit.
In this work, we have proved that the principal subspace of PCA method is preserved via the CS
projection whilst the residual subspace retains its noise-like behavior. This forms the basis for our proposed
algorithm which has been validated using both real and synthetic data. The results indicate that the
proposed approach is highly scalable without any signiﬁcant degradation in performance.
APPENDIX 1
Restricted Isometric Property [4]: An M  N matrix  is said to have the K-RIP property with
the constant K if the following inequalities hold for all K-sparse vector x
(1   K)kxk2
2  kxk2
2  (1 + K)kxk2
2 (11)
APPENDIX 2
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let K = diag[1 :::K] where 1  2  :::K. Using the assumptions above, we have
x  [	s 	n]
2
4 K 0
0 2IN K
3
5
2
4 	T
s
	T
n
3
5; (12)
y = xT: (13)
We shall show that y also has a matching principal subspace in a sense that the K principal eigenvalues
of y, which we denote by 1;:::;K are close to the K principal eigenvalues of x, while the rest is
small. To do so, we ﬁrst deﬁne the residual matrix
E = xT   Ty: (14)
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Applying Theorem 8.1.11 in [11] on approximate invariant subspaces we have
ji   ij 
p
2(kEk2=M + kIM   Tk2kxk2);i = 1;:::;M; (15)
where kk2 denotes the spectral norm and M is the Mth singular value of . We need to show the two
terms are small for the CS case. We note the following results on Gaussian random matrices for large
N (see [10], [3]) that
1  
p
M=N  min()  max()  1 +
p
M=N (16)
holds with an overwhelming probability, where min and max denote the minimum and maximum
singular values.
In our case, sensing matrix  has dimension M by N (M  N) and the entries are i.i.d Gaussian
with mean zero and standard deviation 1 p
N. We can get the deviation bound on the eigenvalues of the
matrix  following equations (3.19) and (3.20) in [4] and for t > 0, we have
Pr(max() > 1 +
p
M=N + t)  e N
t2
2 (17)
Pr(min()) < 1  
p
M=N   t)  e N
t2
2 (18)
The above equations can be modiﬁed as follows:
Pr(max()) < 1 +
p
M=N + t)  1   e N
t2
2 (19)
Pr(min()) > 1  
p
M=N   t)  1   e N
t2
2 (20)
Let  = e N
t2
2 or t =
p
2ln(1=)=N, then we can say that the following equations hold with high
probability 1    (where  > 0),
max()  1 +
p
M=N +
p
2ln(1=)=N (21)
min()  1  
p
M=N  
p
2ln(1=)=N (22)
Similarly,
max(T)  1 + 2(
p
M=N +
p
2ln(1=)=N) (23)
min(T)  1   2(
p
M=N +
p
2ln(1=)=N) (24)
hold with high probability at least 1   . Hence,
kIM   Tk2kxk2  21(
p
M=N +
p
2ln(1=)=N) (25)
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holds with probability 1   .
Next, we bound kEk2. To simplify the maths, we note from the approximate invariant subspace
theory that kEk2 is dependent on whether the subspace induced by the random projection covers the
principal subspace, i.e. their relative geometrical relationship. This relationship is in fact independent of
the coordinates we choose. Suppose that there exists a rotational transformation f : 	 ! I and under
this rotational transformation  ! 0. Another key observation is that  is a Gaussian random matrix.
As the randomness properties of  are unchanged under such rotational transformation, it follows that
0 is also a Gaussian random matrix (see Lemma 2). Because randomness properties are only used in
subsequent derivations and not the actual values of , it is equivalent to set 	 = I when bounding
kEk2. We write  = [1 2] where 1 2 RMK and 2 2 RM(N K). After some straightforward
manipulations and using   2 we have kEk2  kFk2 where
F =
2
4 T
1 (IM   1T
1 )K
 T
2 1KT
1
3
5: (26)
Invoking inequalities on matrix norm (see [11]), we have
kFk2  kT
1 (IM   1T
1 )k2kKk2 + kT
2 1T
1 k2kKk2 (27)
kFk2  1(kT
1 (IM   1T
1 )k2 + kT
2 1T
1 k2: (28)
We now bound the eigenvalues of 1. However, to use the results (17) and (18), we need to scale 1
by introducing 
0
1 =
q
N
MT
1 . It is easy to verify that
(1) = (T
1 ) = (
p
M=N
0
1) =
p
M=N(
0
1) (29)
Similarly, following (17) and for t1 > 0
Pr(max(
0
1) < 1 +
p
K=M + t1)  1   e M
t2
1
2 (30)
if 1 = e M
t2
1
2 , then t1 =
p
2ln(1=1)=M. Now, following (29) and (30), we have,
max(1) 
p
M=N(1 +
p
K=M +
p
2ln(1=1)=M)) (31)
holds with high probability 1   1, where 1 > 0. Similarly,
min(1T
1 )  (M=N)(1   2(
p
K=M +
p
2ln(1=1)=M)) (32)
holds with probability at least 1   1. Next, we will get the bound for ﬁrst right hand term of (28) as
follows:
kT
1 (IM   1T
1 )k2  kT
1 k2k(IM   1T
1 )k2 (33)
February 10, 2009 DRAFTTechnical Report
20
Now combining (31), (32) and (33), we can write
kT
1 (IM   1T
1 )k2 
p
M=N(1 +
p
K=M +
p
2ln(1=1)=M) (34)
holds with high probability 1   1. Next we compute bound for the second term of (28) as follows:
kT
2 1T
1 k2  kT
2 k2k1T
1 k2  kk2k1T
1 k2 (35)
Now, from (21), (31) and (35), we can have
kT
2 1T
1 k2  (1 +
p
M=N +
p
2ln(1=)=N)((M=N) (36)
h
1 + 2(
p
K=M +
p
2ln(1=1)=M)
i
): (37)
After some straight forward simpliﬁcation, we get
kT
2 1T
1 k2  (M=N)(1 +
r
2ln
1
1
(
1
p
N
+
2
p
M
)) (38)
holds with high probability 1   1. Now following (28), (34), (38)
kFk2  1
p
M=N(1 +
p
K=M +
p
2ln(1=1)=M)+ (39)
(M=N)(1 +
r
2ln
1
1
(
1
p
N
+
2
p
M
))

(40)
Since M  N, we have
kFk2  1[
p
M=N(1 +
p
K=M +
p
2ln(1=1)=M)]: (41)
Again combing (15), (25), (41), we get
ji   ij 
p
21[
p
M=N(1 +
p
K=M +
p
2ln(1=1)=M) + (42)
2(
p
M=N +
p
2ln(1=)=N)] (43)
After some straight forward simpliﬁcation and letting  =  1, the following inequality holds with high
probability 1   ,
ji   ij 
p
21(3
p
M=N +
p
K=M + 3
p
2ln(1=)=N) (44)
APPENDIX 2
PROOF OF THEOREM 2 (BOUND ON FALSE ALARM RATE)
As we mentioned in the section IV-D, The residual statistics has normal distribution and the tail
of the distribution is most important in setting a suitable threshold for certain false alarm rate. Since,
according to the CS assumptions, the principal subspace is approximately preserved in CS domain and
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Fig. 8. Tail behavior of normal distribution for original data and CS data
the perturbation in principal eigenvalues are very small (see theorem 1). As a result of this, there is also
a small deviations in false alarm rate. In ﬁgure 8, the continuous graph is showing the tail behavior in
original domain and other two other graphs are perturbed tail behavior in CS domain. The deviation in
the tail behavior also deviates the detection threshold and the false alarm rate respectively.
Following the section 3 in [14], the residual statistics Q has normal distribution and it can be written
(see A.7 in [14]) as,
(
Q
1
)h0  N

1 +
2h0(h0   1)
2
1
;
22h2
0
2
1

: (45)
Here, 1 =
PN
i=K+1 i; ;2 =
PN
i=K+1 2
i; 3 =
PN
i=K+1 3
i; h0 = 1   213
32
2 and K is the number of
principal components. Let, z  N(;), where z = (
Q
1)h0,  = 1 +
2h0(h0 1)
2
1 and  =
22h2
0
2
1 : So
we can write
z 
  N(0;1). Now we have,
Z   

 C (46)
Here, C = (1   ) percentile of normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance, and Z is the
detection threshold limit. We denote the detection threshold in original domain by Zx
 and for CS domain,
it is denoted by Z
y
: Please note, any parameter with superscript/superscript x refers to original data and
with y refers to CS data. As showing in the ﬁgure 8, Zx
 is the detection threshold in original domain
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and get perturbed by an amount of zx
 in CS domain. Hence change in false alarm would be the area
under the curve between zx
 and zx
  zx
 and which can be computed as follows:
Pr(FA) = N(zx
)zx
 (47)
where N(zx
) is short for the pdf value at zx
 Hence, we need to compute the amount of deviation zx
.
Now, we have from (46),
Zx
   x
x
=
Z
y
   y
y
= C: (48)
where,
x = 1 +
x
2hx
0(hx
0   1)
(x
1)2 ; y = 1 +

y
2h
y
0(h
y
0; 1)
(
y
1)2 ; x =
2x
2(hx
0)2
(x
1)2 ; y =
2
y
2(h
y
0)2
(
y
1)2 (49)
So,
Zx
 = x + Cx: (50)
and
Z
y
 = y + Cy: (51)
From (50) and (51), we can write
Zx
   Z
y
 = (x   y) + C(x   y): (52)
and therefore, following the triangle inequality, we get
jZx
   Z
y
j  j(x   y)j + Cj(x   y)j: (53)
Denote
1 = x
1   
y
1 (54)
2 = x
2   
y
2 (55)
3 = x
3   
y
3 (56)
4 = hx
0   h
y
0 (57)
Following [14], we can write (in case of original domain)
x
i = tr(x)i  
K X
j=1
(x
j)i i = 1;2;3: (58)
Similarly we can write (in case of compressed domain),

y
i = tr(y)i  
K X
j=1
(
y
j)i i = 1;2;3: (59)
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Now, from (58) and (59), we get
1 = x
1   
y
1 = (tr(x)   tr(y)) +
K X
j=1
((x
j)   (
y
j)): (60)
We now attempt to bound each RHS term of (59). First, for the trace terms we recall that
tr(x)   tr(y) = tr(x)   tr(xT) (61)
From the previous remark due to Lemma 2, we can assume x being an diagonal matrix. x =
diag(1;:::;N). Let i be the ith column of the matrix T, then we have
tr(xT) = tr(
M X
i=1
T
i xi) = tr(
M X
i=1
(
N X
j=1
2
ijj)) = tr(
N X
j=1
"
j(
M X
i=1
2
ij)
#
) (62)
Since, each column the matrix  is normalized to unity, then we can have,
tr(xT) = tr(x) (63)
Second, we bound the eigenvalues terms of (59) using Theorem 1, which implies that
x
j   
y
j =
p
2x
1(3
r
M
N
+
r
K
N
+ 3
s
2ln 1

N
) (64)
So, combining (60), (63) and (64), we get
1 =
K X
j=1
((x
j)   (
y
j)) =
p
2x
1K(3
r
M
N
+
r
K
N
+ 3
s
2ln 1

N
) (65)
Since, K < M  N, then we have M=N  K=N , and
1  3
p
2x
1O(K
2
4
r
M
N
+
s
2ln 1

N
3
5) (66)
Similarly for n = 2;3 we can prove,
2  6
p
2(x
1)2O(K
2
4
r
M
N
+
s
2ln 1

N
3
5) = 2x
11 (67)
and
3  9
p
2(x
1)3O(K
2
4
r
M
N
+
s
2ln 1

N
3
5) = 3(x
1)21 (68)
Next, we bound each term of (53). From (49), we have
x   y =
x
2hx
0(hx
0   1)
(x
1)2  

y
2h
y
0(h
y
0   1)
(
y
1)2 (69)
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Denote f(x) =
x
2hx
0(hx
0 1)
(x
1)2 ) and f(y) =

y
2h
y
0(h
y
0 1)
(
y
1)2 , where, x =
2
6 6 6
4
x
1
x
2
x
3
3
7 7 7
5
, y =
2
6 6 6
4

y
1

y
2

y
3
3
7 7 7
5
. From (69), we
can write,
jx   yj = jf(x)   f(y)j 
   
@f
@x
1
   x
1 +
   
@f
@x
2
   x
2 +
   
@f
@hx
0
   hx
0 (70)
Now, x
1 = 1;x
2 = 2 and x
3 = 3:, After straight forward manipulation we have ,
f(x) =
x
2

1   2
3
x
1x
3
(x
2)2

 2
3
x
1x
3
(x
2)2

(x
1)2 (71)
which can be simpliﬁed to,
f(x) =  
2
3

x
3
x
1x
2
 
2
3
(x
3)2
(x
2)3

(72)
@f
@x
1
=
2
3
x
3
(x
1)2x
2
(73)
@f
@x
2
=  
2
3

x
3
 x
1(x
2)2 +
2(x
3)2
(x
2)4

(74)
and,
@f
@x
3
=  
2
3

1
x
1x
2
 
4
3
x
3
(x
2)3

(75)
So, from (70), we can write
jx   yj  C11 (76)
where
C1 =

2
3
x
3
(x
1)2x
2
 
2
3

x
3
 x
1(x
2)2 +
2(x
3)2
(x
2)4

x
1  
2
3

1
x
1x
2
 
4
3
x
3
(x
2)3

(x
1)2

(77)
In similar way, we can prove that,
jx   yj  C21 (78)
where
C2 =

 2
2
(1)2 + 2

1
1
+
2
3
3
(2)2

(79)
Then combining (47), (53), (76) and (78), we have
Pr(FA)  1O(K
2
4
r
M
N
+
s
2ln 1

N
3
5) (80)
holds with probability atleast (1   ).
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APPENDIX 3
PRESERVATION OF GAUSSIANITY UNDER UNITARY TRANSFORMATION
The following lemma could have appeared in a standard statistical text. For completeness, the result
and its proof is given to support the claim in the main theorem.
Lemma 2: Suppose that  2 RMN is an iid random matrix whose entries follow a zero-mean
Gaussian distribution with variance 2. Let U 2 RNN be a unitary matrix. Then 0 = U is also an
iid Gaussian random matrix with the same variance 2.
Proof: First we prove that E[0
ij] = E[ij] = 0 and Var[0
ij] = 2. We start from
0
ij =
n X
k=1
ikukj: (81)
Thus
E[0
ij] =
N X
k=1
E[ik]ukj = 0; (82)
whilst due to iid assumption
Var[0
ij] =
N X
k=1
Var[ik]ukj =
N X
k=1
2u2
kj = 2
n X
k=1
u2
kj = 2: (83)
Next, we prove the iid in a similar way, i.e.
E[0
ijmn] = E
"
N X
k=1
ikukj
N X
k0=1
mk0uk0n
#
(84)
=
N X
k=1
N X
k0=1
E[mk0ik]uk0nukj (85)
= 0: (86)
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